Analyses that gauge the relationship of partisanship to economic outcomes nearly always focus on the level of partisanship, and changes to it, at a time concurrent to the outcomes. However, this overlooks the impact of the original design of an institution which can delimit the range of possible outcomes. In this regard, government partisanship at the time an institution was established may correspond more strongly to modern economic outcomes than contemporary measures of partisanship. Additionally, complementarities with other institutions (which may have been created during the same moment of government partisanship) would likewise constrain the range of economic outcomes, thus magnifying the influence of the initial partisanship levels on contemporary outcomes (Hall and Soskice, 2001 ).
To test this argument, I create a partisanship measure that corresponds, roughly, to the time that modern capitalist institutions were created across wealthy democracies. I then test this partisanship measure on key institutions that exhibit strong complementarities to other institutions, and which exhibit distinctive qualities that differentiate liberal market economies from coordinated market economies. The robustness of the results suggests that examination of other economic outcomes that correspond to contemporary partisanship measures may be usefully reexamined in light of the partisanship that existed when the initial institutional bargains were struck.
In the next section -section two -I identify the time period that modern capitalist institutions were created among wealthy democracies. I then identify those economic institutions that typify countries' general economic organization and which tend to strongly complement other institutions in the broader political economy. In the fourth section, I discuss the construction of the partisanship measure before turning to statistical tests in section five. Section six concludes.
II) When Were Modern Capitalist Institutions Created?
Among wealthy democracies, industrialization during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries altered the existing agrarian-based economy and created a new, 'modern' form of capitalism. Following World War I, labor's political influence surged across many European countries, leading to new bargains being struck with regard to the structure of the new institutions of capitalism, which became entrenched over time. But for some countries, the depression and World War II disrupted the structure of their political and economic institutions, and created the opportunity for a new set of institutional bargains after the war ended. Table 1 lists the dates of the last major constitutional change for the 15 countries examined here, illustrating that five countries in the sample significantly altered their institutions after WWII: France, Germany, Japan, Austria, and Italy. Changes to the structure of the constitution after WWII generally correspond to changes in the countries' economic institutions. For example, France nationalized its major commercial banks and many of its largest companies after the war, along with implementing more centralized state control over the general economy, in contrast to its laissez-faire economy before WWII (Alhadeff, 1968) . Sweeping economic reforms that were favorable to labor were likewise implemented in Austria and Italy. The influence of labor in Germany was slightly muted because of American and British influence, nevertheless, new institutional rules were established following the war that firmly entrenched labor's role in the organization of the political economy (e.g., corporate governance reforms; Streeck and Yamamura, 2001) .
ii Allied influence also muted labor's influence in Japan, yet here too rules were implemented that granted more power to labor, as with its corporate governance reforms and the use of lifetime employment policies (Gilson and Roe, 1999 ).
Accordingly, we should look at bargains struck in the early twentieth century for ten of these countries -when many of the rules governing their modern capitalist institutions were established -and immediately after WWII for the other five. Of course, the specific dates will differ for each country, but by constraining the sample to these wealthy countries, the variation in the timing of when their modern capitalist institutions were established is minimized.
III) Which Economic Institutions?
Those economic institutions which exhibit strong complementarities to other institutions offer the broadest implications for understanding the influence of initial bargains on contemporary outcomes. In this regard, I consider the degree of coordination among institutions with an index developed by Hall and Gingerich (2004) . The institutions used to calculate the coordination index include shareholder power, dispersion of control, size of stock market, level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, and labor turnover. High levels of coordination are associated with a more coordinated market economy.
Additionally, I consider specific economic institutions that correspond to the economy's general reliance on market versus non-market mechanisms, such as the size of equities markets relative to banks (which is particularly useful because data are available across the twentieth century), the diffusion of corporate ownership, and the extent of government intervention. Hall and Soskice (2001) , for example, use stock market capitalization relative to GDP as a general indicator for a nation's reliance on arm'slength interactions relative to relationship-based interactions. This is a good measure, but it needs to be treated with caution. Stock markets are known for occasional bubbles and busts, making it a potentially unreliable measure if examining only one point in time.
iii In the long-run (over decades), stock markets tend to settle around an equilibrium price level (e.g., 10% increase per annum for the NYSE), making it preferable to measure a country's reliance on stock markets across long periods of time to gauge a country's overall reliance on markets.
At the same time, looking exclusively at stock markets can be problematic since a nation with a low stock market capitalization does not necessarily mean low non-market (banking) activity -both could be low. Thus, it would be preferable to have a measure for a nation's reliance on banks as well, such as bank loans relative to GDP, or bank deposits relative to GDP (from which bank loans are derived). To avoid this problem, we can take the ratio of the two -stock market capitalization/bank deposits -to get a more balanced assessment of a country's overall reliance on arm's-length vs. relationship-based forms of economic activity.
iv Table 2 shows the average size of stock markets during the pre-and post-World War II periods across countries, revealing that there have been considerable changes between these two periods. The ordering of countries in the postwar period, however, raises some questions with regard to the utility of the stock market capitalization measure as an indicator for the LME-CME orientation of a country since some countries seem out of place, such as Switzerland (being too LME), and the USA (being too CME) relative to conventional assessments of their financial, and capitalist, systems. These results suggest that it may be preferable to account for the reliance on banking. Table 3 illustrates the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank deposits. vi Compared to the stock market capitalization table, the country orderings seem more in line with the LME-CME expectations: the USA is appropriately LME for the post-war period and Switzerland remains on the LME side, but less so than before. Rajan and Zingales (2003) . Tables 4 and 5 show changes to these variables for the pre-and post-WWII periods.
These tables also show the magnitude of the change in these variables, where a small change is expected for those countries that kept their pre-existing constitution (10 is, on average, a small decrease among those countries with no change in their constitution; the size of the stock market increased for some of these countries in the post-war period while for others it decreased. But for countries in which the constitution changed, there is, on average, a large decrease in the size of the stock market capitalization. Table 5 , which uses the preferred measure for the LME-CME orientation of the capitalist economy -stock market capitalization over bank deposits -likewise demonstrates a larger change for those countries that changed their constitutions; more than twice as large of a change, on average, when considering the absolute value of the difference. This dramatic difference is even more emphatic when accounting for the direction of the change. Countries without a constitutional change tended to change towards banks or markets nearly evenly, while those with constitutional changes all moved toward a greater reliance on banks in truly dramatic fashion. 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 .
The box plots in figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the reliance on markets in the post-WWII period differed markedly depending on whether a country's constitution changed after the war. For both measures, the reliance on markets is less than half that of those countries whose constitutions did not change. Note: 0 and 1 correspond to no constitutional change and to constitutional change, respectively. How do we appropriately assess the impact of partisanship on these dramatic and longlasting changes to nations' economic institutions?
IV) Measuring Partisanship
Partisanship is generally regarded as influential to each of the variables discussed above.
The more left wing the government is, the more coordinated the economy tends to be (more CME than LME), the smaller the stock market tends to be relative to banks, the more concentrated ownership tends to be, and the more government intervention in the economy that occurs.
To measure government partisanship, I use an indicator from Franzese (2002) were far weaker at this time than in the interwar years, which is consistent with financial indicators for this period, such as the size of stock markets being relatively larger (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) , and with qualitative assessments of states' general levels of economic intervention being quite low. The scatterplot in figure 3 shows that Japan is a clear outlier. However, its placement at such a far right-wing extreme is problematic since the left exercised considerable bargaining power in the years immediately after the war, when bargains over capitalist institutions were struck (Garon, 1987; Gilson and Roe, 1999) . That Japan is too far left is a result of the partisanship variable being measured in 1950, immediately after the bargains were largely concluded. 
Post-WWII Japan
The Japanese labor movement surged immediately after WWII ended. In December 1945, 380,000 workers were members of labor unions, swelling to 900,000 in January as to appeal to a wide audience, but among its key policy prescriptions, it advocated "maintaining and strengthening state control over banks" (Colbert, 1952: 64) . The program served as the ideological basis for a large segment of the postwar labor movement. The more moderate Socialists, in 1946, proposed a system of state control of key industries (Colbert, 1952: 88) proposed that half of each bank's managers would be selected from among its employees (Colbert, 1952: 90) . The resemblance to France's postwar Socialist Party policies is striking (Kuisel, 1981) . Yoshida now moved the anti-union struggle into high gear. This took two forms: (1) extensive subversion of left-wing unions from within, via 'democratization leagues' or mindō; and (2) an 'anti-inflationary' policy, one of whose chief features was wholesale dismissal of militant workers.
The implementation of the Dodge Plan led to firings and layoffs on a large scale, causing the elimination of a large sector of the militant left, and to the reorganization and strengthening of oligopoly capital. Although the Dodge program involved expanding big industry and therefore employment in big industry, the reorganization was used carefully to weed out militant workers and to weaken the union movement. In 1949 alone, 435,465 workers were dismissed from their jobs, and around 300,000 more in 1950. In the same period, the number of unions declined by over 5,500 and union membership fell by 880,000. The government purges were accompanied by direct promotion of the anticommunist mindō (Halliday, 1978: 217-20) .
As the old workers union (Sanbetsu) and the left were gravely weakened, the Yoshida government, the Employers' Federation (Nikkeiren) and GHQ worked towards a new union coalition based largely on the mindō. The new federation, Sōhyō, was founded in July 1950, immediately after the purge of the Japan Communist Party and the start of the Korean War. As the head of Sōhyō wrote in 1965: "the history of the foundation of Sōhyō is closely connected with the fight against the domination of the Japanese trade unions by the Communist Party" (Halliday, 1978: 220) . Just after the formation of Sōhyō, Sanbetsu membership dropped to 47,000 and in 1953 it went down to 13,000. The Federation was dissolved on February 15, 1958. Sōhyō's domestic platform and the wrecking of the Sanbetsu were a big victory for business in imposing the seniority-wage system and intra-enterprise unions (Halliday, 1978: 220) .
To retain the loyalty of the remaining workers, managers offered them lifetime employment (Price, 1997: 253) . Labor wanted to have influence over the form of corporate financing, making it long-term to suit their employment stability goals.
However, labor was weakened, and their economic initiatives were stymied by America's intervention to quell the growing communist threat. But, as Gilson and Roe (1999) assert, "Because labor retained potential political influence despite the fact that managers recovered workplace authority in the early 1950s, the government wanted [the lifetime employment] bargain [forged in the wake of the labor strife of the late 1940s] to remain stable." Indeed, the postwar constitution contains a 'right to employment' clause that commits government policy to full employment. And legal norms of lifetime employment arose through active courtroom struggles of unions against abusive dismissals of labor activists during the 1940s and 1950s. Japanese courts required employers to show 'just cause' for the dismissal of regular employees, since dismissals were (and are) normally considered an 'abuse of right' that shifts the burden of proof to employers. Thus, firms have had to exhaust alternative measures of reorganization and employment adjustment, thereby strengthening union involvement (Hanami, 1989) . Furthermore, employment security has been supported by effective cross-class alliances with business to make political demands for state support of jobs and employment adjustment in declining industries (Kume, 1998) . Subsequently, the government would intervene by forcing delegated main banks to bail out weak affiliated industrial firms (Aoki, 1994) . In this way, lifetime employment began and endured as a political bargain, with long-term financing arising alongside it as a necessary component of that bargain. Thus, a more accurate POCI measure would correct for this course of events, however, doing so would lead to subjective biases; thus, I leave the Japan measure as is although the results would likely improve were it corrected.
Tests on Individual Institutions
Next, I turn to tests on individual economic institutions. First, I consider measures for the reliance on stock markets: the post-WWII average stock market capitalization relative to GDP and the post-WWII stock market capitalization relative to bank deposits.
ix Both of these measures are tested to demonstrate robustness, although the latter is a better indicator for the general organization of countries' political-economic institutions. Table   9 shows both pre-and post-WWII correlations. While it is useful to observe the pre-WWII correlation, as it shows the robustness of the argument across time, more important to contemporary outcomes is the strength of the POCI measure relative to the other partisanship measures for the post-WWII period. common or civil law (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) . The pre-WWII tests are particularly illuminating since they demonstrate no statistically significant correlation to the legal family variable (which is very heavily cited in economics journals), while the partisan variable remains statistically significant across both periods.
This evidence offers support for critiques of the legal family argument, which charge that it fails to account for the underlying political mechanisms that legal structures arise from, and are conditioned by. Pagano and Volpin's (2001) argument that coalition governments offer more groups the capacity to prevent changes to the status quoconcentrated ownership. Indeed, government partisanship at the time when capitalist institutions were created explains a greater amount of variation in the widely held measure (60%) than other widely cited contemporary partisanship measures (e.g., Roe, 2003 , with an adjusted Rsquared value equal to 45%). Weaker results are observed with respect to medium-sized firms, as shown in table 13. This may be due to actors' greater attention to rules affecting the largest firms, which are more likely to have been important to, and present during, the initial bargains. N  15  15  15  15  15  15  15  15  15 a corporate ownership for a sample of the 20 largest companies with 20% share ownership as the cutoff for blockholding. b corporate ownership for a sample of companies worth more than $500 million with 10% share ownership as the cutoff for blockholding. c corporate ownership for a sample of companies worth more than $500 million with 20% share ownership as the cutoff for blockholding. *** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level; * statistical significance at the 10% level. Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
The extent of government intervention is tested next. In this context, an economy with higher levels of intervention is generally equated with exhibiting stronger features of a coordinated market economy. Intervention is tested with a measure constructed by Nicoletti et al. (1999: 74) and is described as capturing "public ownership" (in turn taking into account the "size" and "scope" of the public sector, "control of public enterprises by legislative bodies," and "special voting rights") and "(state) involvement in business operations" (in turn including "price controls" and "use of command and control regulations"). The control variable, state centralization, is from Verdier (2003). 
VI) Conclusions
The results illustrate the importance of looking at bargains that may have been negotiated many decades prior to an institution's contemporary manifestation. Moreover, crosssection time-series tests that analyze contemporaneous levels and changes to partisanship miss the more fundamental circumstances that contribute to the structure of an economic institution -the nature of the bargains when it was created. The tests here focus on those attributes of capitalist systems viewed as useful indicators for a nation's overall political economy. In view of the robustness of the results for the POCI variable, it would likely be worthwhile reexamining other economic outcomes that correlate with government partisanship.
In addition to implications for understanding the origins of wealthy economies' contemporary institutions, it is useful to keep in mind the importance of the political bargains struck over developing countries' institutions. For those countries presently negotiating the structure of their institutions, the evidence here suggests that the nature of bargains struck today could have decades-long consequences.
